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Abstract
We introduce a voting model that is similar to a Keynesian beauty contest and analyze it
from a mathematical point of view. There are two types of voters-copycat and independent-and
two candidates. Our voting model is a binomial distribution (independent voters) doped in a
beta binomial distribution (copycat voters). We find that the phase transition in this system is
at the upper limit of t, where t is the time (or the number of the votes). Our model contains
three phases. If copycats constitute a majority or even half of the total voters, the voting rate
converges more slowly than it would in a binomial distribution. If independents constitute
the majority of voters, the voting rate converges at the same rate as it would in a binomial
distribution. We also study why it is difficult to estimate the conclusion of a Keynesian beauty
contest when there is an information cascade.
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1 Introduction
AKeynesian beauty contest is a popular concept used to explain price fluctuations in equity markets.[1]
Keynes described the action of rational agents in a market using an analogy based on a fictional news-
paper contest. In the contest, entrants are asked to choose a set of the six most beautiful faces from
among photographs of different women. Those entrants who would select the most popular face
would be then eligible for a prize. A naive strategy would be to choose the most beautiful face
according to the opinion of the entrant. Entrants are known as employing such a strategy indepen-
dent voters. A more sophisticated entrant, aiming to maximize his/her chances of winning a prize,
would try to deduce the majority’s perception of beauty. This implies that the entrant would make a
selection on the basis of some inference from his/her knowledge of public perception. Such voters are
known as copycats. To estimate public perception, people observe the actions of other individuals;
then, they make a choice similar to that of others. Because it is usually sensible to do what other
people are doing, the phenomenon is assumed to be the result of a rational choice. Nevertheless, this
approach can sometimes lead to arbitrary or even erroneous decisions. This phenomenon is called
an information cascade. [2]
Collective herding phenomena in general pose quite interesting problems in statistical physics.
To name a few examples, anomalous fluctuations in the financial market [3],[4] and opinion dynamics
[5] have been related to percolation and random field Ising model. A recent agent-based model
proposed by Curty and Marsili [6] focused on the limitations that herding imposed on the efficiency of
information aggregation. Specifically, it was shown that when the fraction of herders in a population
of agents increases, the probability that herding produces the correct forecast (i.e. that individual
information bits are correctly aggregated) undergoes a transition to a state in which either all herders
forecast rightly or no herder does.
We can observe super-diffusive behaviour in the sense that variance D(L) grows asymptotically
faster than L (where L is the long memory) in several fields.[7],[8],[9],[10], [11] It is characterized by
the variance D ∼ Lα when α > 1. When α = 1, the diffusion of the variance becomes a standard
Brownian motion. For example, in the case of daily financial data, L represents the time series
of data. The past price affects the present price, and the diffusion becomes faster than Brownian
motion. Such phenomena can be attributed to long-range positive correlations. We may observe
dynamical phase transition (from normal to super-diffusive behaviour).[9] In such a phase transition,
correlation plays an important role. Further our voting model shows a similar transition. The herders
make long-range correlations and display super-diffusive behaviour. Therefore, a majority of voters
reach the wrong conclusion.
In this paper, we discuss a voting model with two candidates C1 and C2. As mentioned above,
we set two types of voters-independent and copycat. Independent voters’ voting is based on their
fundamental values; on the other hand, copycat voters’ voting is based on the number of votes. In
our previous paper, we investigated the case wherein all the voters are copycats.[12] In such a case,
the process is a Po´lya process, and the voting rate converges to a beta distribution in a large time
limit.[13] Our present model exhibits a scale-invariant behaviour. This behaviour is observed in the
mixing of the binary candidates. Furthermore, the power law holds over the entire range in a double
scaling limit. This paper is an extension of our previous works.
Although our model is very simple, it contains three phases. We believe that it is as adequate as
the percolation and random field Ising models, and that it is useful for understanding phase transition
in several fields. We discuss two specific issues: one is the distribution in votes that appears for a
mixture of independent and copycat voters and the other is the change in the vote distributions over
time. On the basis of these above mentioned points, we discuss phase transition for information
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cascade.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In section 2, we introduce our voting model and
define the two types of voters-independent and copycat-mathematically. In section 3, we calculate the
distribution functions strictly for the special cases-independent voters always vote for either of the
two candidates; their behavior is not probabilistic. Then, we obtain a solution that is an extension
of the solution given in [14]; in this case, there is no phase transition. In section 4, we discuss more
general cases. We use a stochastic differential equation, the Fokker-Planck equation, and a numerical
simulation. In this model, we can observe phase transition at the ratio of copycats to independents
through the variance of the distributions. There are three phases. If copycats constitute a majority
or number half of the total number of voters, the voting rate converges more slowly than it would
in a binomial distribution. If independents constitute the majority of voters, the voting converges at
the same rate as it would in a binomial distribution. This implies that the proportion of copycats
influences the results of the voting. The last section presents the conclusions.
2 Model
Figure 1: Demonstration of model.
We model the voting of two candidates, C0 and C1. At time t, each candidate has c0(t) and
c1(t) votes. At the beginning (t = 1), the two candidates, C0 and C1, have c0(1) and c1(1) votes,
respectively. Hereafter, we omit the time for the initial votes (c0 ≡ c0(1) and c1 ≡ c1(1)) and define
c ≡ c0 + c1. At each time step, one voter votes for one candidate. Voters are allowed see the number
of votes for each candidate when they vote so that they have knowledge of public perception.
There are two types of voters-independent and copycat. Independent voters vote for C0 and C1
with probabilities 1− q and q, respectively. Their votes are independent of others’ vote and depend
on what they think their fundamental value is. Copycat voters vote for each candidate with the
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probabilities that are proportional to the candidates’ votes. If the number of votes are c0(t) and c1(t)
at time t, a copycat voter votes with probability c0(t)/(c0(t) + c1(t)) for C0 and c1(t)/(c0(t) + c1(t))
for C1. Copycat voters’ votes are based on the number of votes.
Here, we set the ratio of independent voters to copycat voters as 1− p and p, respectively. If we
set p = 1, this system becomes a Po´lya model with c0 starting elements of type C0 and c1 starting
elements of type C1. In this case, it is well known that the distribution of the voting rate is a beta
distribution. As such, this system is a Po´lya process doped with a binomial distribution.
The evolution equation for a candidate C0 is
P (k, t) = p
k − 1
c0 + c1 + t− 2P (k − 1, t− 1) + p(1−
k
c0 + c1 + t− 2)P (k, t− 1)
+(1− p)qP (k, t− 1) + (1− p)(1− q)P (k − 1, t− 1). (1)
P (k, t) is the distribution of the number of votes k at time t for candidate C0. The first and second
terms of (1) denote the votes of the copycat voters; the third and fourth terms denote the votes of
the independent voters. If we set Q(k, t) as the distribution of the number of votes k at time t for
candidate C1, we have the relation
Q(k, t) = 1− P (c0 + c1 + t− 1− k, t). (2)
The initial condition is P (c0, 1) = 1. This is the relation between the back and front.
3 Exact solutions for q = 1 (or q = 0)
In this section, we study the exact solution of (1) for a special case. For q = 1, we obtain the following
master equation:
P (k, t) = p
k − 1
c+ t− 2P (k − 1, t− 1) + p(1−
k
c+ t− 2)P (k, t− 1)
+(1− p)P (k, t− 1). (3)
At this limit, independent voters always vote for only one candidate, C1 (if we set q = 0, independent
voters vote only for C0). The master equation has a simpler form:
P (k, t) = P (k, t− 1)− kp
c+ t− 2P (k, t− 1) +
p
c+ t− 2(k − 1)P (k − 1, t− 1). (4)
When we substitute k = c0 in the above equation, the last term of the RHS vanishes, and thus, the
probability P (k, t) can be calculated easily:
P (c0, t) = (1− c0p
c
)(1− c0p
c + 1
) · · · (1− c0p
c+ t− 2). (5)
For k > C0, we can prove (see Appendix A) that the following equality holds:
P (k′, t) =
k′−c0+1∑
l=1
(−1)l−1 (c0)k′−c0
(1)k′−c0−l+1(1)l−1
(c− (l + c0 − 1)p)t−1
(c)t−1
. (6)
This is the distribution of the votes for the special case wherein the independent voters always vote
for only one candidate, C1.
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If we set p = 1, all voters are copycats, and we obtain the following reduction:
P (k′, t) =
(c0)k′−c0
(c)t−1(1)k′−c0
k′−c0+1∑
l=1
(−1)l−1
(
k′ − c0
l − 1
)
(c1 − l + 1)t−1,
=
(
t− 1
k′ − c0
)
(c0)k′−c0(c1)t−1−k′+c0
(c)t−1
. (7)
This is a beta binomial distribution. At the limit t → ∞, the above equation becomes a beta
distribution. Note that to obtain (7), we use the identity
k′−c0+1∑
l=1
(−1)l−1
(
k′ − c0
l − 1
)
(c1 − l + 1)t−1 = (1)t−1
(1)t−1−k′+c0
(c1)t−1−k′+c0.
In [12], we discussed the physical characteristic of this model. In the limit t → ∞ and c0, c1 → 0
with α = c1/c0 fixed, the scale invariance holds over the entire range.
Here, we can calculate the momentum of these distributions to analyze them. The momentum is
given by
µr(t) =
c0+t−1∑
k=c0
krP (k, t). (8)
We introduce quasi-momentum as
µˆr(t) ≡
c0+t−1∑
k=c0
k(k + 1) · · · (k + r − 1)P (k, t). (9)
We can prove (see Appendix B) that the quasi-momentum can have the following form:
µˆr(t) =
t∑
l=1
(−1)l−1 (c0)t+r
(1)l−1(1)t−l(l + c0 + r − 1)
(c− (l + c0 − 1)p)t−1
(c)t−1
.
(10)
If we set r = 1, we get the average vote
µˆ1(t) =
t∑
l=1
(−1)l−1 (c0)t+1
(1)l−1(1)t−l(l + c0)
(c− (l + c0 − 1)p)t−1
(c)t−1
. (11)
We study t → ∞. The coefficients of master equation (3) do not contain the initial votes for
C0; given by c0. If we set t >> c = c0 + c1, the master equation does not depend on the initial
conditions. Therefore, for a large t limit, the behaviour of the moment does not depend on the initial
conditions c0, and c1. We can also observe this in (17) and (18) in the next section. Here, we set
c0 = c1 = 1 for the representative case. Direct calculation using (10) is difficult. Hence, we study
P (k′, t) as t → ∞. In the above case, distribution (6) becomes a constant distribution with cut-off
k∗. The cut-off implies a fast decay for larger values (k′ > k∗). If we set p = 1, we get a constant
distribution. Using (6), we get
lim
t→∞
P (k′, t) =
k′∑
l=1
(−1)l−1 (1)k′−1
(1)k′−l(1)l−1
t−p. (12)
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For large time values, the only time dependent term is t−lp. In the case of t >> k′, we can assume
that only the first term of the summation is non-negligible. Therefore,
lim
t→∞
P (k′, t) ∼ t−p. (13)
Cut-off k∗ is the inflection point of P (k′, t). Using (12), we can obtain k∗ = tp + 2. Then, the
momentum is
µr(t) ∼
k∗∑
k=1
krP (k, t) ∼ trp. (14)
(14) is a continuous function of p. Hence, there is no phase transition throughout. In the next
section, we study the general case in the continuous limit.
4 Asymptotic cases
To investigate long-ranged correlations, we analyze in the limit t→∞. We can rewrite (3) as
c0(t) = k → k + 1 : P (k, t) = kp
c+ t− 1 + (1− p)(1− q)
=
p
2
(1 +
2k − (c+ t− 1)
c+ t− 1 ) + (1− p)(1− q).
(15)
We define ∆t = 2c0(t) − (c + t − 1) with the initial condition ∆1 = c0 − c1 = 2c0 − c. We change
the notation from k to ∆t for convenience. Then, we have |∆t| = |2k − (c+ t− 1)| < c+ t− 1. The
support for the law of ∆t is thus {∆1 − (t − 1),∆1 + (t − 1)}. Given ∆t = s, we obtain a random
walk model
∆t = s→ s+ 1 : P s+c+t−1
2
,t =
p(s+ c+ t− 1)
2(c+ t− 1) + (1− p)(1− q),
∆n = s→ s− 1 : Q s+c+t−1
2
,t = 1− P s+c+t−1
2
,t.
Let ǫ = 1/c→ 0. We now consider
Xτ = ǫ∆[t/ǫ],
P (x, τ) = ǫP (∆t/ǫ, t/ǫ), (16)
where τ = t/ǫ and x = ∆t/ǫ. Approaching the continuous limit, we can obtain the Fokker-Plank
diffusion equation for this process (see Appendix C):
∂P
∂τ
=
1
2
∂2P
∂x2
− p
τ + 1
∂(xP )
∂x
− (1− p)(1− 2q)∂P
∂x
. (17)
We can also obtain Xτ such that it obeys a diffusion equation with small additive noise:
dXτ = [(1− p)(1− 2q) + px
τ + 1
]dτ +
√
ǫdBτ , X0 =
c0 − c1
c
. (18)
Though (17) and (18) are equivalent, hereafter, we only deal with (18) for simplicity. Assume c0 is
random or deterministic. Let
σ20 ≡ σ2(Y0) = 4ǫ2σ2(s) (19)
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be the variance of X0. If X0 is Gaussian (X0 ∼ c(y0, σ20)) or deterministic (X0 ∼ δx0), the law of Xτ
ensures that the Gaussian is in accordance with density
pτ (x) ∼ 1√
2πστ
e−(x−xτ )
2/2σ2τ , (20)
where xτ = E(Xτ ) is the expected value of Xτ and σ
2
τ ≡ vτ is its variance. If Φτ (λ) = log(eiλXτ ) is
the logarithm of the characteristic function of the law of Xτ , we have
∂τΦτ (λ) =
p
1 + τ
λ∂λΦτ (λ) + i(1− p)(1− 2q)λ− ǫ
2
λ2 (21)
and
Φτ (λ) = iλxτ − λ
2
2
vτ . (22)
Identifying the real and imaginary parts of Φτ (λ), we obtain the dynamics of the mean of Xτ as
x˙τ =
p
1 + τ
xτ + (1− p)(1− 2q). (23)
The solution for xτ is
xτ = (x0 + 2q − 1)(1 + τ)p + (1− 2q)(1 + τ) ∼ (x0 + 2q − 1)τ p + (1− 2q)τ. (24)
Since we are interested in the voting rate obtained, we introduce a new scaled variable:
x˜τ ≡ xτ
τ
.
The solution for x˜τ is
x˜τ ∼ (x0 + 2q − 1)τ (p−1) + (1− 2q). (25)
When p 6= 1, x˜τ ∼ 1 − 2q. This implies that the average percentage of C0’s votes againt the total
poll is 1 − q. When p = 1, x˜τ ∼ x0. This agrees with our assertion that the scaled distribution of
votes becomes a beta distribution when τ is large. In this case, the mean value does not change.
From the above discussion, we can infer that the distribution becomes similar to a delta function.
The question of how this distribution converges to a delta function constitutes the next problem.
To investigate this, we analyze the dynamics of the variance. The dynamics of vτ are given by the
Riccati equation
v˙τ =
2p
1 + τ
vτ + ǫ. (26)
If p 6= 1/2, we get
vτ = v0 +
∫ τ
0
(
1 + τ
1 + r
)2p(
2p
1 + r
v0 + ǫ)dr = v0(1 + τ)
2p + ǫ
∫ τ
0
(
1 + τ
1 + r
)2pdr
= v0(1 + τ)
2p +
ǫ
1− 2p(1 + τ)
2p((1 + τ)1−2p − 1). (27)
If p = 1/2, we get
vτ = v0 +
∫ τ
0
(
1 + τ
1 + r
)(
1
1 + r
v0 + ǫ)dr = v0(1 + τ) + ǫ(1 + τ)log(1 + τ). (28)
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Now, we can summarize the temporal behaviour of the variance as
vτ ∼ ǫ
1− 2pτ if p <
1
2
, (29)
vτ ∼ (v0 + ǫ
2p− 1)τ
2p if p >
1
2
, (30)
vτ ∼ ǫτ log(τ) if p = 1
2
. (31)
Here, we introduce rescaled variables
v˜τ ≡ vτ
τ 2
.
The solution for v˜τ is
v˜τ ∼ ǫ
1− 2pτ
−1 if p <
1
2
, (32)
v˜τ ∼ (v0 + ǫ
2p− 1)τ
2p−2 if p >
1
2
, (33)
v˜τ ∼ ǫ log(τ)
τ
if p =
1
2
. (34)
If p = 1, v˜τ becomes v0. This agrees with our assertion that the distribution of votes becomes a
beta distribution. If p > 1/2 or p = 1/2, candidate C0 gathers 1 − q of all the votes in the scaled
distributions, but the voting rate converges more slowly than that in a binomial distribution. If
0 < p < 1/2, the voting rate becomes 1− q, and the distribution converges as it would in a binomial
distribution. Hence, if independent voters form a majority, the distribution of votes becomes similar
to a delta function and the convergence is at the same rate as that in a binomial distribution. If
copycat voters form the majority, the distribution remains the same but the convergence is at a rate
slower than that in a binomial distribution. In this phase, it is difficult to ascertain the causes for the
delay of the convergence. Similar phenomena can be seen in several fields. In daily financial data,
the motion of the price does not represent a Markov process, and it is difficult to forecast the future
price. [10] In fact, it has been pointed out that the motion of price is super-diffusive behaviour and
the stochastic differential equation for price is similar to (18).[9] When all voters are copycats, the
distribution becomes a beta distribution and does not converges.
Curty and Marsili [6] recently introduced a model about information cascade. Their model is
based on game theory. They showed that when the fraction of herders in a population of agents
increases, the probability that herding produces the correct forecast undergoes a transition to a state
in which either all herders forecast rightly or no herder does. Their model is similar to the limitation
of our model in the case wherein voters are unable to see the votes of all the voters but can only
see the votes of previous voters. However, there is a significant difference between our model and
their model with respect to the behaviour of copy cats. In their model, copycats always select the
majority of votes, which is visible to them. Thus, the behaviour becomes digital (discontinuous). We
aim to carry out an analysis of the influence of this behaviour in the future.
We now consider the correlation. For a beta binominal distribution, we can define the parameter
ρ ≡ 1/(c + 1).[13] This parameter represents the strength of following a decision. If we set ρ = 1,
everyone votes for the candidate who received the first voter’s vote. On the other hand, when ρ = 0,
copycats become independent. It should be noted that our conclusion does not depend on ρ except
when ρ = 0. For large t, convergence is not related to ρ, but is related to p, the appearance probability
of independent voters.
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Here we discuss the solution in the previous section. If we set q = 0 (q = 1 is the same as rela-
tion(2)), (15) becomes 0 for large t. This is because independent voters’ votes become deterministic.
Hence, in (17), the diffusion term disappears. In (26), the noise term ǫ disappears, and the dynamics
of vτ are given by
v˙τ =
2p
1 + τ
vτ . (35)
Then, phase transition disappears, and the behaviour of v0 is continuous
v˜τ ∼ (v0)τ 2p−2 for all p. (36)
This result is acceptable, following the discussion in the previous section and that (10) is continuous
with respect to p. (See (14).) If there is a consensus about the fundamental value, copycat voters
affect the convergence in proportion to their ratio. Further, in this case, the convergence does not
depend on correlation ρ.
In order to confirm the analytical results pertaining to the asymptotic behaviour, we perform
numerical simulations. We use the master equation (4) directly.
Figures 2 and 3 display the deformation of the distribution of votes for C0 over time t. Figure
2 is the case wherein the independent voters vote for C0 with the probability 1 − q, and Figure 3
is the case wherein the independent voters always vote for C0. We can see that the distribution
converges to a delta function for the votes of the independent voters. If all voters are copycats
(p = 1), the distribution becomes a beta binomial distribution. Because of the doped binomial
distribution (independent voters), the distribution is deformed. For the case q = 0, we can obtain
an exact solution in section 3.
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Figure 2: Asymptotic behaviour of the distribution
of votes for C0 at t = 100 → 10000 for q = 1/3
and p = 0.9, 0.3.
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Figure 3: Asymptotic behaviour of the distribution
of votes for C0 at t = 100 → 10000 for q = 0 and
p = 0.9, 0.3.
Figures 4 and 5 display the resulting scaled variance for different p. The distribution converges
to a delta function over time. However, there are differences between Figures 2 and 3 at p ≥ 0.5.
The difference is in the speed of the convergence that is characterized by the scaled variance v˜.
In the general case (q 6= 0, 1), we can recognize the phase transition (Figure 4). If p > 0.5, the
variance converges at the same rate as that in a binomial distribution (slope = −1). If p < 0.5 or
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Figure 4: Asymptotic behaviour of the scaled vari-
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Figure 5: Asymptotic behaviour of the scaled vari-
ance v˜τ for q = 0 and p = 0.9, 0.7, 0.5, 0.3, 0.1.
p = 0.5, super-diffusive behaviour is exhibited, and convergence is slower than that in a binomial
distribution (slope > −1). The cases p < 0.5 and p = 0.5 represent two different phases. For other
cases (q = 0, 1), the slope changes continuously (Figure. 4).
5 Concluding Remarks
We investigated a voting model that is similar to a Keynesian beauty contest. Mathematically, our
model is a binomial distribution (independent voters) doped in a beta binomial distribution (copycat
voters). We calculated the exact solution for special cases and analyzed the general case using a
stochastic differential equation. In the special cases, there is no phase transition. We will extend
this function to the general q in the future. We believe that the obtained solution is a useful clue to
understand phase transitions clearly.
In general, q, the correlation structure, exhibits a dramatic change at a critical value of the
doping. If copycats constitutes a majority or number half of the total number of voters, the variance
converges slower than it would in a binomial distributions. This implies that our conclusion is
extremely volatile because the fundamental value becomes irrelevant, and it is difficult to estimate
the conclusion of the vote.
We observed phase transition in the limit t→∞. However, the long memory is finite; therefore,
this gives rise to the question of whether we can observe the phase transition. This question arises
because in this case, voters are unable to see the votes of all the voters but can only see the votes of
previous voters. This model is useful to understand the model introduced by Curty and Marsili.[6]
We intend to address this issue in the future.
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Appendix A
We prove the assumption (42). Multiplying (3) by (−1)k−c0(l− 1)!/{(k− 1)(k− 2) · · · c0(l− k+ c0−
1)!} = (−1)k−c0(1)l−1/(c0)k−c0(1)l−k+c0−1 and summing over k = c0, c0 + 1, · · · , l + c0 − 1 we get
l+c0−1∑
k=c0
(−1)k−c0 (1)l−1
(c0)k−c0(1)l−k+c0−1
P (k, t)
=
l+c0−1∑
k=c0
(−1)k−c0 (1)l−1
(c0)k−c0(1)l−k+c0−1
P (k, t− 1)− p
c + t− 2
×
l+c0−1∑
k=c0
(−1)k−c0 (1)l−1
(c0)k−c0(1)l−k+c0−1
[kP (k, t− 1)− (k − 1)P (k − 1, t)]],
(37)
where (z)i = z · (z + 1) · · · (z + i − 1). We call the second and third terms of the RHS without the
coefficient p/(c0 + c1 + t− 2) A and B, respectively. We can rewrite A as
A =
l+c0−2∑
k=c0
(−1)k−c0 (1)l−1
(c0)k−c0(1)l−k+c0−1
kP (k, t− 1)
+(−1)l−1 (1)l−1(l + c0 − 1)
(c0)l−1
P (l + c0 − 1, t− 1). (38)
We can rewrite B as
B =
l+c0−1∑
k=c0+1
(−1)k−c0 (1)l−1
(c0)k−c0−1(1)l−k+c0−1
P (k − 1, t− 1)
= −
l+c0−2∑
k=c0
(−1)k−c0 (1)l−1(l − k + c0 − 1)
(c0)k−c0(1)l−k+c0−1
P (k, t− 1). (39)
Then, A−B is given by
A−B = (l + c0 − 1)
l−1∑
k=c0
(−1)k−c0 (1)l−1
(c0)k−c0(1)l−k+c0−1
P (k, t− 1). (40)
Substituting (40) in (37), we can obtain the time evolution of the summation:
l−k−1∑
k=c0
(−1)k−c0 (1)l−1
(c0)k−c0(1)l−k+c0−1
P (k, t)
=
c+ t− 2− (l + c0 − 1)p
c+ t− 2
l−k−1∑
k=c0
(−1)k−c0 (1)l−1
(c0)k−c0(1)l−k+c0−1
P (k, t− 1).
(41)
For k > C0, we can prove that the following equality holds:
l+c0−1∑
k=c0
(−1)k−c0 (1)l−1
(c0)k−c0(1)l−k+c0−1
P (k, t) =
(c− (l + c0 − 1)p)t−1
(c)t−1
. (42)
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The analytic form can be obtained by multiplying both sides with (−1)l−1(k′− 1)(k′− 2) · · · s/[(k′−
l− c0 + 1)!(l− 1)!] = (−1)l−1(c0)k′−c0−1/[(1)k′−l−c−0+1(1)l−1] and summing over l = 1, · · · , k′− c0 + 1
P (k′, t) =
k′−c0+1∑
l=1
(−1)l−1 (c0)k′−c0
(1)k′−c0−l+1(1)l−1
(c− (l + c0 − 1)p)t−1
(c)t−1
. (43)
Appendix B
Replacing the analytical form (9), we can obtain
µˆr(t) =
c0+t−1∑
k′=c0
(k′)r
k′−c0+1∑
l=1
(−1)l−1 (c0)k′−c0
(1)k′−l−c0+1(1)l−1
(c− (l + c0 − 1)p)t−1
(c)t−1
.
(44)
Further,
t+c0−1∑
k′=c0
k′−c0+1∑
l=1
=
t∑
l=1
t+c0−1∑
k′=l+c0−1
(45)
and
t+c0−1∑
k′=l+c0−1
(k)r
(c0)k−c0
(1)k′−l−c0+1(1)l−1
=
(c0)r+t
(1)l−1(1)t−l(l + c0 + r − 1) . (46)
the quasi-momentum can have the following form:
µˆr(t) =
t∑
l=1
(−1)l−1 (c0)t+r
(1)l−1(1)t−l(l + c0 + r − 1)
(c− (l + c0 − 1)p)t−1
(c)t−1
.
(47)
Appendix C
We use δXτ = Xτ+ǫ −Xτ and ζτ , a standard iid Gaussian sequence; our objective is to identify the
drift fτ and variance g
2
τ such that
δXτ = fτ (Xτ )ǫ+
√
ǫgτ (Xτ )ζτ+ǫ. (48)
Given Xτ = x, using the transition probabilities of ∆n, we get
E(δXτ ) = ǫE(∆[τ/ǫ]+1 −∆[τ/ǫ]) = ǫ(2p[ l/ǫ+c+τ/ǫ−1
2
],τ/ǫ
− 1) = ǫ[(1− p)(1− 2q) + px
τ + 1
]. (49)
Then, the drift term is fτ (x) = (1− p)(1− 2q) + px/(τ + 1). Moreover,
σ2(δXτ ) = ǫ
2[12p
[
l/ǫ+c+τ/ǫ−1
2
],τ/ǫ
+ (−1)2(1− p
[
l/ǫ+c+τ/ǫ−1
2
],τ/ǫ
)] = ǫ2, (50)
such that gǫ,τ(x) =
√
ǫ. In the continuous limit, we can obtain the Fokker-Plank diffusion equation
for this process:
∂P
∂τ
=
1
2
∂2P
∂x2
− p
τ + 1
∂(xP )
∂x
− (1− p)(1− 2q)∂P
∂x
. (51)
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